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THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
MONITORING IN THE ALASKA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
PRACTICAL YET INCOMPLETE
ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION
NATASHA ALLADINA*
ABSTRACT
Alaska’s prisons are full, but crime has not come to a standstill. The
costs of incarceration continue to rise and so do the number of
inmates. The State has found itself in the midst of an urgent
dilemma—it must control the mounting costs of criminal justice yet
ensure public safety. It must also ensure that criminals receive just
punishment. And since packing prisons has proved an inadequate
solution, it is time to search for effective alternatives. This Note
proposes increasing the use of electronic monitoring as an alternative
to incarceration. The current electronic monitoring program in
Alaska has addressed budget concerns but has not met crime
reduction goals. Thus, the Note proposes a “hybrid” electronic
monitoring program—one that combines the current electronic
monitoring program with other alternatives to incarceration,
including therapeutic justice and halfway housing. This “hybrid”
should maximize resources and minimize costs, helping to correct the
prison-packing predicament of the Alaskan criminal justice system.

INTRODUCTION
With one of the fastest-growing prison populations in the United
States, Alaska faces an urgent criminal justice dilemma of how to control
costs while maintaining public safety.1 Alaska spends $44,000 per

* The author is a member of the Class of 2011 at Duke University School of
Law and received a B.A. in English from Emory University in December 2007.
1. STEPHANIE MARTIN AND STEVE COLT, INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE, RESEARCH SUMMARY NO. 71, THE
COST OF CRIME: COULD THE STATE REDUCE FUTURE CRIME AND SAVE MONEY BY
EXPANDING EDUCATION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS? 1 (2009) [hereinafter THE
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inmate per year, and prisons are at full capacity.2 In addition to curbing
the rising costs of incarceration and the number of inmates, the state
must simultaneously ensure public safety and effective use of tax
dollars.3 And, of course, offenders must receive punishments that
appear just and serve retributive, deterrent, and rehabilitative or
reintegrative goals.4 Because increasing the prison population has failed
to thwart the mounting crisis,5 the use of alternatives to incarceration
has become imperative. One such alternative is electronic monitoring.
The Electronic Monitoring (EM) program in Alaska, governed by
sections 33.30.061(c) and 33.30.065 of the Alaska Statutes,6 “allows
inmates who meet certain requirements to serve time at home.”7 Eligible
offenders apply to one of five Electronic Monitoring Offices, located in
Anchorage, Fairbanks, Kenai, Ketchikan, and Sitka.8 If approved, an
offender pays a twelve or fourteen dollar fee per day plus ten dollars for
a urinalysis test.9 She may then serve her sentence from home, in
accordance with specific terms and conditions.10 Outwardly, Alaska’s
EM program, like several others across the country, appears to provide a
cost-effective and viable alternative to incarceration.11 However,
successful use of EM has not yet been fully realized in the state.12 This is
COST OF CRIME], available at http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/
researchsumm/RS_71.pdf.
2. Id. at 2. The $44,000 per inmate per year figure is actually less than its
1980s counterpart. Id. Martin and Colt contend that even so, the figure is still
high. Id. But cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
11 (2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t18.pdf
(documenting state and local justice system per capita expenditures and
specifically documenting Alaska’s high per capita expenditures on corrections as
$279.09—second only to those for the District of Columbia).
3. THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 1.
4. See generally Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67
(2005) (discussing the limitations of and conflicts between various contemporary
sentencing rationales).
5. THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 1.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.061(c) (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.065 (2010).
7. Electronic
Monitoring,
ALASKA
DEP’T
OF
CORR.,
http://
www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/institutions/anch/anchEM.jsf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2011).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See ALASKA DEP’T OF CORR., ELECTRONIC MONITORING TERMS AND
CONDITIONS (2007), available at http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections
/institutions/anch/docs/SW_Terms_and_Conditions.pdf.
11. See THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 3 fig.6 (demonstrating that the
state saves about twenty-two times the amount it spends by using EM as an
alternative to incarceration).
12. See id. (noting that, although significantly less expensive than other
alternatives to jail and prison, EM has not been shown to reduce future crime in
Alaska).
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due to several factors, including the newness of the technology,13 but
courts’ confusion with how to apply credit from time served while on
EM to sentencing has been particularly problematic. The Alaska Court
of Appeals’ holding in Matthew v. State14 is a telling example.
In Matthew, the court applied its rule from an earlier case, Nygren v.
State,15 holding that petitioner’s court-ordered condition of release—
EM—did not amount to “restrictions approximating those experienced
by one who is incarcerated.”16 The court further held that a petitioner
subjected to pretrial conditions of release that are the same as those
experienced by a sentenced individual should not automatically receive
credit for time served.17 Although the court affirmed the “restrictions
approximating those experienced by one who is incarcerated”18
standard set out in Nygren, the case as a whole demonstrates a
continuing lack of clarity about the effective and efficient use of EM in
the criminal context—especially with respect to its dissimilar use in the
pretrial and sentencing contexts. Embedded in this uncertainty is the
need to manage prisons and balance punitive goals with budget
concerns. The current EM program in Alaska has addressed budget
concerns, but has not met crime reduction goals.19 At the same time,
prisons are still overcrowded.20 This Note attempts to put these various
issues into perspective and proposes a possible solution that could

13. See DICK WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG: THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF
OFFENDERS 36–37 (1997) [hereinafter WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG] (citing
Ronald Corbett and Gary T. Marx, Critique: No Soul in the Machine; Technofallacies
in the Electronic Monitoring Movement, 8 JUST. Q. 399–414 (1991)).
14. Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) (holding that
credit was not given when conditions during EM were not “approximate” to
those in incarceration).
15. 658 P.2d 141, 146–47 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (holding that credit for time
served while released on bail or probation is determined by the “extent to which
a person released on bail or probation is subjected to restrictions approximating
those experienced by one who is incarcerated”).
16. Matthew, 152 P.3d at 473 (quoting Nygren, 658 P.2d at 146).
17. See id.
18. Id. (quoting Nygren, 658 P.2d at 146).
19. See THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 3.
20. See id. at 2 (supporting the claim that Alaska prisons are full by
comparing the 1980 rate of incarceration—2 in 1000 Alaskans behind bars—to
the current rate of 10 in 1000, and acknowledging that “the 1,500-bed prison
scheduled to open in 2012 is projected to be full soon after it opens”); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2003), tbl.6.30.2009,
available
at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6302009.pdf
(documenting percent change in number of prisoners under Alaska’s
jurisdiction, which increased 3.3 percent from 4173 prisoners in 2000 to 5167 in
2007); id. at tbl.6.2, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t62.pdf
(documenting the total number of Alaska adults under correctional supervision
in 2003 as 10,900, 41.7 percent of whom were incarcerated).
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successfully incorporate EM into the Alaskan criminal justice system
both efficiently and effectively.
Part I discusses the nature of EM in the criminal justice system and
focuses on the present use of it in the Alaskan correctional system. Part
II analyzes the state of the law concerning EM in Alaska. Part III probes
both the potential of and the controversy surrounding the use of EM as
an alternative to incarceration through the lenses of efficiency and
effectiveness. Part IV then proposes a practical approach to EM that
merges its use with other alternatives to incarceration.

I. THE NATURE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. What Is Electronic Monitoring?
1. Electronic Monitoring in General
EM is a tool that is often used in conjunction with house
confinement or house arrest to monitor an offender’s whereabouts and
restrict his movements.21 By using electronic devices that emit electronic
signals, EM systems can track an offender’s location and ensure
compliance with the requirements of sentencing or supervised release.22
EM systems vary widely and include a range of options such as
“home monitoring devices, wrist bracelets, ankle bracelets, field
monitoring devices, alcohol testing devices, and voice verification
systems.”23 In a typical EM program, offenders wear uniquely coded
electronic transmitter devices.24 This uniquely coded device sends a
signal to a home monitoring device located in offenders’ homes and
communicates with a central computer (and monitoring specialists)
located in a monitoring center via telephone line.25 Because offenders
must follow a regimented schedule and because their uniquely coded

21. DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONS 319 (2006).
22. Id.
23. NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT & CORR. TECH. CTR., KEEPING TRACK OF
ELECTRONIC MONITORING 2 (1999) [hereinafter NLECTC], available at
http://www.justnet.org/Lists/JUSTNET%20Resources/Attachments/859/Elec
-Monit.pdf; see also Matthew DeMichele & Brian Payne, Using Technology to
Monitor Offenders: A Community Corrections Perspective, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug.
2009, at 35 (providing examples of EM devices that agencies are currently
experimenting with, including kiosk reporting, secure remote alcohol detection,
GPS, and voice verification).
24. NLECTC, supra note 23, at 2.
25. Id.
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devices signal any deviations from that schedule, monitoring specialists
are able to keep track of offenders’ activities at all times.26
Electronic offender monitoring occurs either passively or actively.27
Passive EM systems usually require an offender to speak to a case officer
via telephone (e.g. voice verification system) or verify his presence by
inserting an electronic transmitter, unique to him, into a home
monitoring device.28 These systems may also require an offender to
breathe into a home breathalyzer device to determine his sobriety.29
Active EM systems, on the other hand, have the advantage of constantly
monitoring an offender’s whereabouts and do not depend on the
offender’s cooperation.30
2.

Economic, Practicability, and Eligibility Issues Surrounding the Use
of Electronic Monitoring
With either the passive or active EM model, certain economic,
practicability, and eligibility issues arise. First, EM programs require
participating offenders to have access to homes with telephone land
lines.31 Since these are not available to all who may wish to participate,
the requirement unfairly limits the pool of eligible offenders at the
outset—discriminating against the poor and those who do not have
homes or phones.32 Consequently, “[a] challenge that the rich get tagged
and the poor get prison might well have some substance.”33 But at the
same time, EM is viewed as more economical than incarceration
precisely because most offenders subjected to EM programming must
cover the costs of that sanction.34
Second, the criminal justice process as a whole is not without an
underlying profit motive.35 EM programs resulted from privatization

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration
Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 375 (1995) (“Without a stable address and phone,
the [EM] program cannot be used for an otherwise eligible offender.”).
32. See DICK WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET 106 (2001) [hereinafter
WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET]. Whitfield cites the American Civil Liberties
Union’s (ACLU) concern that EM would deny offenders an equal opportunity to
participate by discriminating against those without homes and telephones. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Brian K. Payne & Randy R. Gainey, The Electronic Monitoring of
Offenders Released from Jail or Prison: Safety, Control, and Comparisons to the
Incarceration Experience, 84 PRISON J. 413, 415 (2004).
35. See WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET, supra note 32, at 109.
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and eventually, public-private partnerships,36 and the commercial
pressures of the private sector may have led to overselling and
unrealistically high expectations.37 The powerful interest groups that
form this sector may have framed EM as more advantageous than it
actually was,38 thereby contributing to “the unexpectedly slow
development of electronic monitoring.”39
Third, EM programs typically target low-risk offenders.40 The term
“low-risk” reflects both the actual offenses committed and the
characteristics of the offenders, including first-time offenders, those who
committed non-violent or property offenses, and those with structured
living arrangements.41 Moderate- to high-risk offenders may also be
subjected to EM programming, but the EM used for these types of
offenders consistently differs from that used for those who are
considered to be lesser risks.42 Specifically, “[in] low-risk populations,
EM may be used by itself or in conjunction with other forms of lowcontact monitoring. In moderate to high-risk populations, EM is more
likely to be one part of a program that involves human contact and
supervision, drug treatment, or other services.”43 Accordingly, for
higher risk offenders, EM may prove to be a more rehabilitative and
complete alternative to prison. Yet, because further research is
necessary, this conclusion is, at best, a speculative one. For now, those
most often selected for EM programming, whether passive or active,
continue to be those who are low-risk offenders, or as some have
argued, those that “probably don’t need to be monitored anyway.”44

36. See id.
37. See id. at 112–13.
38. See WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 47 (“’Success’ rates on
electronic monitoring—as in so much of criminal justice—are infinitely elastic,
easily manipulated and often conceal more than they reveal. They should be
treated with considerable caution.”).
39. WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET, supra note 32, at 113.
40. See MACKENZIE, supra note 21, at 319; see also WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE
TAG, supra note 13, at 46; DeMichele & Payne, supra note 23, at 36 (recognizing
that “community corrections focus on technologies designed for low-risk
offenders because these offenders do not need face-to-face interaction . . . [and]
are people who have committed crimes that deserve to be addressed but who do
not present any unique risk to society”).
41. WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 46–47.
42. See Marc Renzema & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Can Electronic Monitoring
Reduce Crime for Moderate to High-risk Offenders?, 1 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 215–16 (2005) (describing how the use of EM differs according
to the type of risk an offender presents); see also DeMichele & Payne, supra note
23, at 35 (“[M]any different practices are used to monitor offenders in the
community, including classifying offenders by risks, needs and change levels.”).
43. Renzema & Mayo-Wilson, supra note 42, at 215–16.
44. WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 47 (citation omitted).
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3. Electronic Monitoring in Alaska
Alaska has adopted a passive EM system. The Anchorage
Correctional Complex, for example, requires an offender to connect a
large black box, a Field Monitoring Device, to the power and phone lines
in her home.45 The offender must keep the phone lines clear at the
designated call time and must answer after the fourth ring.46 In some
instances, the offender must also provide a breath sample using a
“sobrietor” device.47 More remotely, in Mat-Su Valley, the Kids Are
People, Inc. EM program requires a juvenile probationer to connect a
base unit to the phone line in her home.48 The offender must also wear
an ankle bracelet that transmits signals to a receiving computer.49 Then,
at preplanned intervals throughout the day, indicator lights trigger
reporting from the offender so that information on her location is
periodically updated into a file that is monitored and then reviewed by
case managers at the Mat-Su Youth Corrections Office.50
B. The History of Electronic Monitoring Use in Law Enforcement
1. Early Electronic Monitoring Programming and Design
Whether testing sobriety or ensuring that an offender remains
within a certain radius, EM systems provide a means of enforcing
compliance with conditions of supervised release, or “community
control.”51 But this punitive aspect of “compliance” was not what the
systems’ designers originally had in mind for the systems’ prototype.52
Instead, the designers sought “to help offenders gain self-esteem and

45. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORR., ANCHORAGE CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX ELECTRONIC
MONITORING GUIDELINES FOR SOBRIETOR AND FIELD MONITORING DEVICE (FMD),
available
at
http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/institutions/anch/
docs/EM_Guidelines.pdf.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. N.E. Schafer & Pamela Martin, Justice Ctr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage,
Evaluation of a JAIBG-Funded Project: Voice and Location Telephone
Monitoring
of
Juveniles
3–4
(2001),
available
at
http://
justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2000/0010kap/0010.kap.pdf.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id.
51. See Ralph Kirkland Gable & Robert S. Gable, Electronic Monitoring:
Positive Intervention Strategies, 69 FED. PROBATION 21, 21 (2005) (noting EM
documents violations of community supervision better than more traditional
procedures); see also MACKENZIE, supra note 21, at 319 (describing how
technological advances of EM made it possible to ensure compliance with EM
correctional programs).
52. See Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21.
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socially valued skills.”53 Others, including Jack Love, a former federal
public defender and judge, specifically sought to create a scheme that
would keep individuals out of prison.54 Love focused on probationers
who had breached their probation orders and, in 1983, first used an
electronic device to monitor five offenders.55 He wanted to know
whether EM would allow probation to continue on a restricted basis,
reducing various white collar offenders’ exposure to risks of violence in
prison.56 That curiosity helped stimulate the commercial use of EM for
correctional purposes.57 Another system was developed by Thomas
Moody in Florida, and “[b]y 1987, 21 states had reportedly begun EM
programs, with more than 900 offenders being monitored.”58 “[B]y 1993,
EM was employed in all fifty states . . . [and] approximately seventy
thousand offenders were being monitored electronically.”59 By 2005,
about twenty percent of community-based supervision programs in the
United States had incorporated the use of EM and about twenty private
companies provided the necessary equipment.60
2.

Prison Overcrowding as a Driving Force Behind the Growth of
Electronic Monitoring Use
Although a number of factors contributed to the rapid growth of
EM programs in the 1980s and onward, prison overcrowding is
consistently cited as a driving force.61 In the 1980s, prison populations

53. Id.
54. See id.; see also WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 34.
55. Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21; see also WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG,
supra note 13, at 34.
56. See WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 34.
57. Id. at 33–34; see also Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21. Inspired by “a
‘Spiderman’ story in which the villain attached an electronic bracelet to
Spiderman to monitor his movements,” Judge Jack Love persuaded Michael
Goss to develop a similar apparatus. Id. His curiosity helped develop and
commercialize EM equipment. Id. But Judge Love was not the first to experiment
with EM. Id. Dr. Ralph Schwitzgebel of Harvard University is credited with
patenting the first correctional EM system in 1969. Id.
58. See Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21 (citation omitted).
59. MACKENZIE, supra note 21, at 319 (citation omitted).
60. See Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21.
61. See, e.g., Michael G. Maxfield & Terry L. Baumer, Home Detention with
Electronic Monitoring: Comparing Pretrial and Postconviction Programs, 36 CRIME &
DELINQ. 521, 521–22 (1990). In addition to prison and jail overcrowding, factors
contributing to the rapid growth of EM included private entrepreneurs’
aggressive marketing of EM equipment as a solution to prison and jail
overcrowding and the extension of home detention to broader categories of
offenders, such as those directly released from prison or jail and those who had
not been convicted but were held in lieu of bail. Id. at 522. Yet another was the
belief in the infallibility of EM technology, also known as a “technofallac[y].” See
Terry L. Baumer & Robert I. Mendelsohn, Electronically Monitored Home
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“had reached a crisis point in both legal and financial terms” and led to
judicial mandates to limit prison intake.62 Unfortunately, the situation is
no better today and, for Alaska, the problem is particularly acute. In the
1980s, the state expanded its justice system and enforced stiffer, more
uniform sentences for the most serious felonies.63 A sharp increase in the
number of incarcerated individuals resulted.64 By 2007, Alaska had five
times the inmates it had in 1981, and spending for the state’s justice
system almost doubled in those years.65 An immediate solution was
needed both in the state and across the country, and the technologically
advanced (and less expensive) alternative of EM offered a seemingly
“quick fix.”66 The shortcomings of probation programs only added to
the “nothing works” debate and incentivized the rapid rise of EM
programs in correctional systems.67
3.

The Interests Served and Overarching Goals of Correctional
Electronic Monitoring Programs
Effective marketing of EM equipment by retailers also contributed
to the rapid rise of correctional EM.68 As any profit-seeking businessmen
would do, these retailers saw an opportunity in the prison
overcrowding crisis and seized it.69 And, by strategically offering an
inexpensive, utilitarian, and immediate solution to overcrowded
prisons, EM vendors found a receptive audience in correctional
departments across the country.70 These departments faced a pressing
need to protect their communities from potentially dangerous offenders

Confinement: Does it Work?, in SMART SENTENCING: THE EMERGENCE OF
INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS (J.M. Byrne, A.J. Lurigio, & J. Petersilia eds., 1992) 54,
54; see also WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET, supra note 32, at 9 (citing “technical
advances, a huge and costly rise in prison populations and the growing use of
house arrest or curfew schemes” as the three reasons why, in the 1980s, the
increased development of EM became possible).
62. WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 35.
63. THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1.
66. See WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 36 (describing how
the allure of new EM technology and the belief that it would provide an
immediate solution to the problem of rising crime led to the rapid growth of EM
programming).
67. See id. at 37 (explaining the failures of traditional probation that led to a
sudden rush for experimental alternatives such as EM).
68. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 522.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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and could not do so with prisons at maximum capacity.71 They therefore
had a strong interest in a solution that would specifically deter
offenders—one that would keep potentially dangerous offenders off the
streets and under appropriate custody.72 EM programming appeared to
offer just that.73
In reality, the conditions imposed under EM programs are less
restrictive than those imposed under traditional incarceration.74 This
means the use of EM may actually benefit the same individuals it is
supposed to punish.75 EM programs provide certain offenders a more
rehabilitative option of reintegrating back into their communities while
still serving time for their wrongdoings.76 As a result, the programs may
promise more return as specific and utilitarian deterrents (in terms of
providing efficient, economic, and secure public safety) and even more
as rehabilitating and reintegrative alternatives to incarceration. And it is
quite possibly this promise—rather than one rooted in a retributive
goal—that has maintained the growth of EM programming in
corrections.77
But while the growing number of EM programs might point to
success in terms of quantity, a few questions still remain: Have the
programs succeeded in terms of quality? How do the programs compare
to incarceration or other punitive options? Is EM enough of a sanction?
Is it efficient? What is the best use of EM programming for Alaska?

71. See id. at 521–22 (describing how chronic overcrowding in jails and
prisons led “to desperation on the part of criminal justice officials . . . [and] a
frantic search for punitive, safe, and secure alternatives to incarceration”).
72. See The Legality of Innovative Sanctions for Nonviolent Crimes, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 1944, 1960–61 (1998) (discussing criminal sentencing’s goal of protecting the
public from dangerous offenders through incarnation).
73. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 522.
74. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 432 (recognizing that although EM
is less restrictive than other sanctions, it “is still punitive and potentially
rehabilitative” even if it “is often misinterpreted as a slap on the wrist”).
75. Offenders commented that they preferred EM to incarceration and
viewed EM as controlling, but not nearly as controlling or invasive as prison; the
EM option afforded them certain everyday luxuries and freedoms that they were
denied in prison. Id. at 428. For example, they enjoyed control over the television
and being able to eat whatever they wanted and whenever they wanted. Id.
76. See id. at 416.
77. Retributive rationales for punishment often conflict with utilitarian and
rehabilitative rationales. See generally Frase, supra note 4, at 75–77 (discussing the
limitations of and conflicts between various contemporary sentencing
rationales). The attractive promise advertised by EM retailers appeared to
resolve this conflict and therefore appealed to correctional departments both in
the United States and abroad. However, EM programs probably hold more
“promise” as deterrents and even more so as mechanisms of
rehabilitation/reintegration for reasons discussed below. See infra Part III.B.
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The remainder of this Note will address these questions and others
and will ultimately propose a solution that maximizes the potential of
EM in Alaska by incorporating it into other correctional programs.

II. THE LAW ON ELECTRONIC MONITORING
Any attempt to maximize the potential of EM must comport with
the current law on the subject, and therefore, it is critical to understand
the parameters of that statutory framework. This Part endeavors to
explain the relevant statutes and case law effecting EM in Alaska.
Because EM is still relatively new and EM programming is still gaining
momentum as an “effective” alternative to incarceration, the law
governing its use is sparse and still developing. This is especially true in
Alaska. A few statutes and cases provide some guidance, but the law on
the correctional use of EM is far from settled.
A. The Statutes Governing Correctional Electronic Monitoring in
Alaska
At present, two statutes control the use of EM in Alaska—Section
33.30.061, and more significantly, Section 30.30.065 of the Alaska
Statutes. Section 33.30.061(c) allows for the use of EM at the discretion of
the Department of Corrections commissioner but expressly excludes
certain classes of offenders:
The commissioner may, under [section 33.30.365], designate a
prisoner to serve the prisoner’s term of imprisonment or period
of temporary commitment, or a part of the term or period, by
electronic monitoring. A prisoner serving a term of
imprisonment, or a period of temporary commitment, for a
crime involving domestic violence is not eligible for electronic
monitoring.78
Section 33.30.065 provides specific, practical guidelines for
administering EM.79 Subsection (a) mandates that EM be administered
by the Department of Corrections and that EM equipment be designed
“so that any attempt to remove, tamper with, or disable the monitoring
equipment or to leave the place selected for the service of the term or
period will result in a report or notice to the department.”80 Subsection
(b) lists criteria for

78. ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.061(c) (2010).
79. § 33.30.065.
80. § 33.30.065(a).
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determining whether to designate a prisoner to serve a term of
imprisonment or period of temporary commitment by
electronic monitoring, [including]
(1) safeguards to the public
(2) the prospects for the prisoner’s rehabilitation
(3) the availability of program and facility space
(4) the nature and circumstances of the offense for which
the prisoner was sentenced or for which the prisoner is
serving a period of temporary commitment;
(5) the needs of the prisoner as determined by a
classification committee and any recommendations
made by the sentencing court;
(6) the record of convictions of the prisoner, with
particular emphasis on crimes specified in AS 11.41 or
crimes involving domestic violence;
(7) the use of drugs or alcohol by the prisoner; and
(8) other criteria considered appropriate by the
commissioner.81
Subsection (c) emphasizes that EM does not provide an offender
with a liberty interest and that a “prisoner may be returned to a
correctional facility at the discretion of the commissioner.”82 Subsection
(d) permits the commissioner to require an offender to pay all or some of
the costs of EM, but acknowledges that only offenders with sufficient
financial resources should be subjected to such a requirement.83
Both sections 33.30.061(c) and 33.30.065 of the Alaska Statutes only
pertain to sentencing.84 In Alaska, there is no statutory law on the use of
EM for pretrial, pre-sentencing, or pre-appeal purposes. The closest such
statute, section 12.25.025(c) of the Alaska Statutes, has been interpreted
to extend credit for time spent in pretrial, pre-conviction, or pre-appeal
custody,85 but this has not included time spent on EM—yet.86 And while
several cases have explained the applications of section 12.25.025(c) of
the Alaska Statutes in non-EM situations, the statute has proven quite
controversial with respect to EM.

81. § 33.30.065(b).
82. § 33.30.065(c).
83. § 33.30.065(d).
84. See § 33.30.61(c); § 33.30.065.
85. § 12.55.025(c) (“A defendant shall receive credit for time spent in custody
pending trial, sentencing, or appeal, if the detention was in connection with the
offense for which sentence was imposed.”).
86. Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
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B. The Case Law on Alternatives to Incarceration
The case law governing EM use in Alaska has developed in
response to the enactment of statutes governing alternatives to
incarceration (mainly sections 12.25.025(c), 33.30.061(c), and 33.30.065 of
the Alaska Statutes) and case law directing the use of those alternatives.
This precedent has set limits on alternatives to incarceration, and the
limits, in turn, have implications for EM. Understanding the precedent
governing alternatives to incarceration is therefore useful for
understanding the current status of correctional EM in the state.
1. The Early Cases Defining Appropriate Alternatives to Incarceration
In its 1980 decision Lock v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled
that “upon revocation of probation, one is entitled to credit against his
sentence on the original offense for time spent as a condition of
probation, in a rehabilitation program which imposes substantial
restrictions on one’s freedom of movement and behavior.”87 In Nygren v. State,
the Alaska Court of Appeals sought to determine what types of
restrictions meet the “’substantial restrictions on one’s freedom of movement
and behavior’” test.88 It concluded that credit for time served while
released on bail or probation is determined by the “extent to which a
person released on bail or probation is subjected to restrictions
approximating those experienced by one who is incarcerated.”89 The
court also listed several characteristics common to incarcerative
facilities, noting that those characteristics, though not exhaustive, were
“at least sufficient to serve as sound points of reference for determining,
in any given case, whether ‘substantial restrictions on one’s freedom of
movement and behavior’ have been imposed, so as to require credit for
time served under Lock.”90 The list included the following restrictive
characteristics:
[R]esidents are invariably sent there by court order; the
facilities require residency, and residency requirements are
sufficiently stringent to involve a definite element of
confinement; residents of the facilities are subject to twentyfour hour physical custody or supervision; any periods during
which residents may be permitted to leave the facility are
expressly limited, both as to time and purpose; while in the

87. Lock v. State, 609 P.2d 539, 545 (Alaska 1980) (emphasis added).
88. Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141, 144 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis
added) (quoting Lock, 609 P.2d at 545).
89. Id. at 146.
90. Id.
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facility, residents are under a continuing duty to conform their
conduct to institutional rules and to obey orders of persons
who have immediate custody over them; and residents are
subject to sanctions if they violate institutional rules or orders
and to arrest if they leave the facility without permission.91
2. Cases Applying the Nygren Example to Non-Electronic Monitoring
Alternatives
The Nygren test has already been applied to award credit for time
served in residential alcoholism treatment programs92 and Community
Residential Centers (CRCs).93 In the 2002 case State v. Fortuny, the Alaska
Court of Appeals gave the defendant credit against his sentence for the
time he voluntarily spent in a residential alcoholism treatment facility
before sentencing.94 The court began its analysis by first comparing the
Nygren list of restrictions (deemed equivalent to incarceration) to the
restrictions imposed by the residential program in which Fortuny
participated. It reasoned that the defendant’s work release privileges at
the facility were “not conspicuously different from the work release
privileges that are granted to selected prisoners in the custody of the
Department of Corrections.”95 The court also noted that the facility
provided twenty-four hour supervision, required conformity to a set of
house rules, and subjected residents to bed checks, random checks, and
random urine and breath tests.96 Because these restrictions generally
complied with the remainder of the Nygren factors, the court granted
Fortuny credit for the time he served there and ruled that work release
constituted “a supplemental method of correction” rather than “a
vacation from correctional supervision.”97
That same year, in Potter v. State, the court was presented with the
question of whether Nygren credit could be applied to time spent under
the court-ordered custody of a CRC prior to sentencing.98 Again, the
court began its analysis by going through the Nygren test.99 It then
reasoned that the restrictions imposed by the CRC in custody of Potter
amounted to incarceration as defined by Nygren. It emphasized how the

91. Id.
92. See, e.g., State v. Fortuny, 42 P.3d 1147, 1147–50 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
93. See, e.g., Potter v. State, No. A-8080, 2002 WL 818059, *1–2 (Alaska Ct.
App. May 1, 2002).
94. See Fortuny, 42 P.3d at 1152.
95. Id. at 1151.
96. Id. at 1148–49.
97. Id. at 1151–52.
98. Potter, 2002 WL 818059, at *1.
99. See id. at *2.
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CRC required Potter to remain there under strict supervision, only
permitted him to leave unescorted under limited circumstances, and
would subject him to sanctions if he violated program rules and
regulations.100 Much as it did in Fortuny, the court relied on the Nygren
test and held that Potter should not be barred from receiving credit
toward the time he served at the CRC merely because he was regularly
allowed to leave the facility to work.101
By testing the Nygren list of restrictions approximating
incarceration against the specific restrictions imposed by various
incarcerative facilities, the Alaska Court of Appeals effectively extended
credit for time served in residential alcohol treatment programs and
CRCs prior to sentencing. Its decisions in Fortuny and Potter also
cemented the fact that work release privileges would not hinder a
defendant from receiving credit for time served at a residential alcohol
treatment program or CRC prior to sentencing. Unfortunately, the same
has not been true of EM programming since the Alaska Court of
Appeals has firmly refused to extend credit to time served on EM prior
to sentencing.102
3. Why Electronic Monitoring Does Not Fit the Nygren Test – the
Matthew v. State Perspective
In Matthew v. State, the Alaska Court of Appeals denied defendant
Matthew credit toward his sentence of imprisonment for the time he
voluntarily spent subjected to EM.103 After his sentencing, Matthew
asked the trial court to delay the date on which he was to report for
incarceration.104 He specifically asked for a sixty-day extension that
would allow him to work in Barrow while being monitored by a private
EM system known as “secure continuous remote alcohol monitoring,” or
SCRAM.105 The SCRAM system is an ankle bracelet that detects alcohol
consumption through skin pores and tracks a subject’s whereabouts
through an attached global positioning system, or GPS.106 In Alaska it is
operated by a private company, Alaska Monitoring Services.107

100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
103. See id. at 471, 473.
104. See id. at 470.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also Alcohol Monitoring Systems, Inc., The SCRAMx System,
SCRAMX,
http://www.alcoholmonitoring.com/index/scram/the-scramxsystem (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (describing SCRAMx, the new generation of
the SCRAM system).
107. Matthew, 152 P.3d at 470.
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Per Matthew’s request, the trial judge granted the stay of
imprisonment and ordered him confined to work, home, and travel back
and forth.108 The judge also told him that no credit would be awarded
toward his sentence for any time served while released on EM.109 The
same occurred at Matthew’s bail hearing, where he was granted another
delay of his imprisonment.110 Nevertheless, Matthew attempted to
obtain credit toward his sentence of imprisonment for the time he spent
subjected to EM.111 His motion was denied, and Matthew subsequently
appealed.112
In its ultimate ruling, the appellate court incorporated the same
analytical method it did in both Fortuny and Potter, starting with a
review of the Nygren test.113 It also noted that it must review de novo
whether the conditions of release imposed on Matthew sufficiently
approximated incarceration.114 The court then analyzed the conditions of
release Matthew faced under EM.115 It found that those restrictions
included requirements that Matthew be at home, work, or commuting in
between and that his movements and alcohol consumption be
constantly monitored by EM.116 It further found that the restrictions did
not amount to “‘restrictions approximating those experienced by one
who is incarcerated.’”117
The court reasoned that “Matthew’s day-to-day activities were
unencumbered by the kind of institutional rules and routines that are
the hallmark of correctional or residential rehabilitative facilities.”118 It
also observed that “[t]he conditions of release did not subject him to the
kind of structured, regimented lifestyle that is the central feature of both
incarceration and residential treatment programs.”119 The court then
explained its interpretation of EM’s shortcomings, specifying that
Matthew “could do whatever he wanted to do (except for consume
alcohol) and was free to associate with whomever he wanted.”120
Moreover, he “did not suffer the same lack of privacy experienced by an

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 472.
See id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141, 146 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 473.
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offender in an incarcerative facility or residential program.”121 The court
again referred to its analysis as an application of the Nygren test before
concluding that the restrictions imposed on Matthew did not
“‘approximate those experienced by one who is incarcerated.’”122
In its reasoning, the court broadly claimed to have applied the
Nygren test, but a closer examination suggests that it instead focused on
one particular Nygren factor,123 that “while in the facility, residents are
under a continuing duty to conform their conduct to institutional rules
and to obey orders of persons who have immediate custody over
them.”124 Such a focus fits with the fact that EM differs from residential
alcohol treatment programs and CRCs in one critical respect—an
offender lives within the confines of his or her own home (or other
private residence) rather than in a communal or more institutional
facility. In recognizing a structured, regimented lifestyle as “the central
feature of both incarceration and residential treatment programs” and
institutional rules and routines as “the hallmark of correctional or
residential rehabilitative facilities,”125 the court elevated the significance
of this one Nygren factor to become more of a requirement rather than a
mere “point of reference.”126 Its decision to deny Matthew credit for the
time he served on EM turned on a perceived lack of institutional rules,
regulations, and structure in EM correctional programming.127
4. Rethinking the Outcome in Matthew v. State128
In its interpretation of Nygren, the court in Matthew failed to clarify
what is meant by “institutional rules and routines.” For example, are
institutional rules and routines only administered in an institution?
Because the Department of Corrections administers EM sanctions, are
the regulations imposed under EM still institutional? Do such
institutional rules and routines completely inhibit an incarcerated
individual from exercising any free will, enjoying free association, or
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 472–73.
124. Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141, 146 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
125. Matthew, 152 P.3d at 472.
126. See Nygren, 658 P.2d at 146 (explaining that although not exhaustive, the
common characteristics of incarcerative facilities set out in Nygren “are at least
sufficient to serve as sound points of reference for determining, in any given
case, whether ‘substantial restrictions on one’s freedom of movement and
behavior’ have been imposed, so as to require credit for time served under Lock”
(quoting Lock v. State, 609 P.2d 539, 545 (Alaska 1980))).
127. See Matthew, 152 P.3d at 472–73.
128. The author gives special thanks to Professor Lisa Kern Griffin, Duke
University School of Law, for her assistance with the development of this
section.
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maintaining privacy? None of these questions are answered by the
Court of Appeals in Matthew. As a result, if EM is to obtain independent
standing as an alternative to incarceration—one that could give credit
toward an offender’s sentence—a reworking of the Matthew decision is
necessary.
Nygren aside, the decision in Matthew may affect how other courts
interpret credit for time served on EM when it is used before trial or
prior to sentencing. This, in turn, could influence whether these courts
will ever interpret EM as a sufficient sanction, at least with respect to
retribution rationales. In other words, the parameters placed on the use
of EM in the pretrial context could affect those placed on EM sanctions.
Moreover, the purposes of pretrial detention (especially pretrial release
under EM) could also have an effect on EM sanctions. Instead of
retribution, punishment, or general deterrence, the rationale behind
pretrial detention is based on protecting communities from potentially
dangerous offenders (specific deterrence) and ensuring that offenders
appear at court proceedings.129 EM’s strength is just that (in addition to
serving rehabilitative or reintegrative purposes). Thus, the strengths of
EM are most apparent in the pretrial context. It is very likely that EM
also has unrealized potential as a sanction, but policymakers and
lawmakers must first examine its use in the pretrial context to determine
what works and what challenges may arise in the sentencing context.
The Matthew court’s treatment of EM credits suggests that there
might be some reluctance to viewing EM as a sufficient sanction. In its
analysis, the court emphasized EM’s inability to satisfy the “institutional
rules” prong of Nygren.130 It also expressed a concern that Matthew “did
not suffer the same lack of privacy experienced by an offender in an
incarcerative facility or residential program.”131 That concern might be
even more acute in the sentencing context. But, while the court was
correct in acknowledging that EM is advantageous to offenders, its
reasoning was somewhat misguided.
An offender may watch television at his will or choose what he will
have for lunch while subjected to home confinement under EM, but his
privacy is hardly undisturbed. He must respond to routine phone calls
or video check-ins, may have his every move tracked by an electronic
device, and may be subjected to random checks or visits from EM
129. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS, Pretrial Release Standard 101.1: Purposes of the Pretrial Release Decision, available at http://
www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pretrialrelease_blk.html#10-1.1; see also
Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 534 (“Pretrial detention seeks to protect the
public while bringing defendants to trial.”).
130. See Matthew, 152 P.3d at 472.
131. Id. at 473.
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officers or administrators. These constraints clearly do not amount to
those experienced under traditional incarceration, but they are
nevertheless adequate. In fact, the use of EM may very well be
advantageous for the correctional system as a whole because it frees
space in jails and prisons, it costs less than incarceration, and it benefits
yet penalizes offenders. So even though EM may fall short under a strict
application of Nygren, it would likely prove viable under a broader
assessment. In particular, when a court-ordered sanction is at issue, EM
could prove particularly viable because a court-ordered sanction
presumably imposes the most stringent possible requirements.
Accordingly, and in spite of the suggestion in Matthew, a court-ordered
EM sanction could prove even more successful than its pretrial
counterpart, which is designed as an alternative to detention and which
presumes release.
The court’s “something is missing with EM” opinion in Matthew
hinders defendants from obtaining credit for pretrial, pre-appeal, and
pre-sentencing release under EM, and therefore it has limited EM’s
potential as an alternative to incarceration. A solution that resolves EM’s
supposed lack of institutional structure would likely remedy the
problem. One particularly promising option is to incorporate EM into
other court-approved alternatives to pretrial, pre-appeal, and presentencing incarceration, such as residential alcohol treatment programs
or CRCs. A proposal for such a “hybrid” use of EM and other
alternatives to incarceration is presented in Part IV.

III. THE POTENTIAL AND THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE
USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING
This Part will address the broader potential and possible pitfalls of
EM—an analysis that must necessarily precede any Alaska-specific
proposal for new, or modified, EM programming. The Alaska Court of
Appeals’ recent decision in Matthew reflects a narrow view of EM’s
potential and thus provides an interesting point of comparison. That
view might lead to a conclusion that EM is less valuable than
incarceration. But, as noted by the National Law Enforcement and
Corrections Technology Center, “EM offers two distinct advantages over
incarceration.”132 The first is cost-effectiveness.133 The second is a
reduction in prison overcrowding.134 For the purposes of this Note, these

132. NLECTC, supra note 23, at 1.
133. See id.
134. Id.
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“advantages” will be respectively analyzed in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness.
A. The Efficiency Rationale
1. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Electronic Monitoring
On average, EM programs cost between five and twenty-five
dollars per day.135 Incarceration costs, on the other hand, average fifty
dollars a day—at least twice the cost of EM.136 Yet, the comparatively
inexpensive EM equipment is not the only cost-effective benefit that EM
programs promise. Other tangible benefits include pretrial release of
offenders who would have otherwise been detained, early release from
incarceration and the resulting reduction in overall confinement costs,
reduced costs for repeated treatment enrollments, and finally, a
diminished need for the construction of new prisons.137 The realization
of such cost savings will vary according to the actual costs of
incarceration and EM equipment and programming in a specific
jurisdiction.138 In Alaska, the high number of inmates and lack of prison
space is a particularly pressing issue.139 For example, the new Mat-Su
prison, scheduled to open in 2012, is already expected to be full soon
after it opens.140 Strategically expanding EM programming would offer a
workable solution that could potentially curb the need for another MatSu (or several) in the future.
Already, Alaska has seen savings in social costs because EM
programs allow offenders to work and later pay off the costs of EM
participation.141 But such intangible savings are not all. Currently, the
135. See id. This claim was based on 1999 estimates of EM program costs. Id.
136. See id. In 1999, the cost of incarceration per inmate per day in Alaska was
$97.92. In Louisiana, it was $30.36. ANN H. CROWE ET AL., AMERICAN PROBATION
AND PAROLE ASS’N, OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY: A
USER’S GUIDE 44 fig.5b (2002), available at http:// www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/197102.pdf. But cf. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Office
of Pub. Affairs, Costs of Incarceration and Supervision, THE THIRD BRANCH (May
2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/05-05-01/Costs_
of_Incarceration_and_Supervision.aspx (citing Bureau of Prisons statistics
indicating that the cost of imprisonment in a Bureau of Prisons facility at the
time was $63.51 per inmate per day).
137. See CROWE ET. AL., supra note 136, at 27, 44–45.
138. Id.
139. See generally THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1.
140. Id. at 4 fig.8.
141. See CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 45; see also NLECTC, supra note 23, at
1 (contending that communities benefit from EM “because offenders are paying
taxes, taking care of their families, and sometimes even going to school to
increase their future employment options”).
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use of EM saves the state about twenty-two times more than it would
spend on incarceration.142 This figure trumps all other alternatives to
incarceration but falls short in one regard—reduced recidivism rates.143
Other alternatives to prison have saved the state money and successfully
reduced recidivism rates.144 Thus, with respect to recidivism, the failures
of Alaska’s current correctional EM programming suggest that EM is not
the cheap “quick fix” it may appear to be.
And while EM is cost-effective relative to incarceration, there are
still cost concerns. Intangible costs, or “hidden fees,” of EM use include
initial investments in staff time for education and marketing purposes
and investments in the planning process for incorporating EM use into
existing correctional options.145 An increased net-widening effect
(whereby offenders who would have otherwise been successfully
supervised without EM would now be placed in an EM program),
opportunity costs (in terms of other correctional programs that could be
implemented), and increased technical violations (which could lead to
additional court hearings or reincarceration and therefore result in extra
costs to the justice system) also add to the cost of EM.146 These potential
costs, along with concerns about the effectiveness of EM programming
as opposed to incarceration or other alternatives, stress the need for
careful and calculated spending on correctional EM.
2. Electronic Monitoring on the Alaska Budget
Alaska’s spending on correctional EM depends on several factors,
with federal spending in Alaska the primary factor. After the 1980s oil
boom faded, Alaska increasingly relied on federal spending to fuel the
state’s economy.147 Between 1993 and 2003, federal spending in the state
more than doubled (not counting inflation), but nationwide, federal
spending increased only about fifty percent.148 Between 1996 and 2002,
federal spending for grants jumped from $1.3 billion to $3.1 billion, and
fifty-six percent of grants were undesignated.149 Because such
undesignated grants could provide funding for electronic supervision

142. THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 3 fig.6.
143. See id.
144. Id. (providing examples of alternatives to incarceration that have saved
the state money and helped reduce recidivism, including therapeutic courts and
adult residential treatment for substance abuse).
145. CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 43.
146. Id.
147. Scott Goldsmith & Eric Larson, What Does $7.6 Billion in Federal Money
Mean to Alaska?, UNDERSTANDING ALASKA, Nov. 2003, at 4, available at
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/FedSpendSum.pdf.
148. Id. at 1.
149. See id.
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programs, the fifty-six percent is critical. While it is true that grants are
only one of several sources of EM program funding,150 in Alaska, federal
spending and federal grants make up a vast portion of the state’s
economy.151 As such, the ways in which federal grants are allocated
could indirectly yet significantly impact the state’s correctional EM
programs. Because Alaska is a young, developing state and because only
a few private industries bring in new revenue, federal spending is
important to the state’s economy and, ultimately, to EM
programming.152
Despite the ample (and increasing) federal spending in Alaska,
total state spending on corrections has not experienced as substantial a
jump—yet. The state’s operating budget has grown, but the percentage
spent on corrections has been rather steady.153 This percentage has also
lagged in comparison to other states. In Fiscal Year 2007, Alaska spent
5.3% of its total state government expenditures on corrections while the
nation on average spent 6.8%.154 Moreover, “[e]xpenditures for the major
justice system agencies—Department of Corrections, Public Safety, and
Law, the Alaska Court System, Public Defender Agency, and Office of
Public Advocacy—have comprised about 9 percent of Alaska’s total
state agency spending for the past ten years (FY 2000-2010).”155 The
figures are especially dreary for correctional EM. For Fiscal Year 2009,
the Department of Corrections received $245,962,000 in resources “to
achieve results,”156 but just 914.1 Results Delivery Units (RDU) were

150. See CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 46–47 (discussing sources for EM
program funding, including grants and government funding, private donations,
in-kind resources and resource sharing, and offender fees).
151. See generally Goldsmith & Larson, supra note 147.
152. Id. at 2.
153. See Justice System Operating Expenditures, ALASKA JUST. F., Spring 2009, at
1, 2, available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/26/1spring2009/
261.spring2009.pdf. The total operating budget for Alaska’s justice system (in
actual expenditures) for Fiscal Year 2000 was $336,883,300, or 9.6% of the total
state budget. Id. Of that amount, the Department of Corrections received 4.4%,
or $153,725,500. Id. For Fiscal Year 2010, the total projected operating budget for
the justice system is $566,220,700 (9.2% of the total state budget) and the total for
the Department of Corrections is $224,223,300 (3.7%). Id.
154. See THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA
2008
14
(2008),
available
at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/
uploadedFiles/ One%20in%20100.pdf.
155. See Justice System Operating Expenditures, supra note 153, at 2.
156. STATE OF ALASKA, FY2009 GOVERNOR’S OPERATING BUDGET, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE MEASURES 4 (2007), available at http://
www.gov.state.ak.us/omb/09_omb/budget/DOC/perfmeas_20.pdf.
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allotted to EM.157 In contrast, 13,099.1 RDU were allotted to statewide
probation and parole and 16,827.6 RDU were allotted to Community
Residential Centers in an effort to manage prison populations.158 Clearly,
if efficient EM use is to occur, Alaska will have to invest more in EM by
adjusting spending priorities and allocating more resources to the
Department of Corrections, which in turn should allocate more to EM
programming. This will have to happen alongside a broader effort to
attain more substantial federal grants for the state’s justice system.
B. The Effectiveness Rationale
1. What Does the Current Research Tell Us? General Purposes and
Successes of Electronic Monitoring
Other than cost savings, EM promises a reduction in prison
overcrowding.159 But the promise actually extends much further. A few
original purposes of EM included reintegrating offenders into the
community, treating them, and to a lesser degree, punishing and
deterring them from future criminal conduct.160 Others included public
safety, compliance with mandates to reduce prison and jail
overcrowding, and the provision of the most cost-effective correctional
services.161 At present, however, these purposes have focused almost
exclusively on inexpensive and safe ways to provide surveillance or
incapacitation while relieving overcrowded jails and prisons.162 In a
sense, then, these “new” purposes of EM actually tend to emulate the

157. STATE OF ALASKA, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, COMPONENT SUMMARY FOR
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/omb/
10_omb/budget/DOC/amended/10amd_4-3-09_compsummary_gf_doc.pdf.
158. Id.
159. NLECTC, supra note 23, at 1.
160. Randy R. Gainey, Brian K. Payne & Mike O’Toole, The Relationship
Between Time in Jail, Time on Electronic Monitoring, and Recidivism: An Event
History Analysis of a Jail-Based Program, 17 JUST. Q. 733, 746 (2000).
161. CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 14.
162. See Jody Klein-Saffran, Electronic Monitoring vs. Halfway Houses: A Study
of Federal Offenders, ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION, Fall 1995, at 1 (excerpts
from unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Maryland) (stating that the
primary purpose of current community corrections programs is to provide
surveillance or incapacitation for as little cost as possible), http://
www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/gen_program_eval
/orepralternatives.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2011); see also DeMichele & Payne,
supra note 23, at 34 (discussing Rios and Greene’s notion of the justice
reinvestment movement, a concept suggesting that current use of community
corrections is meant to offset state budgets by serving as an alternative to
incarceration) (citing N. RIOS & J. GREENE, REDUCING RECIDIVISM: A REVIEW OF
EFFECTIVE STATE INITIATIVES (2009)).
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retributive and deterrent purposes of incarceration, which primarily
seek “to punish offenders, to protect society by removing dangerous
offenders from society, and to deter future criminal behavior.”163
Alaska’s current EM program is an apt example. As such, when
evaluating the effectiveness of the program, the state’s policymakers
must keep in mind the many different purposes EM was intended to
serve (as opposed to incarceration) and the diverse goals it aspired to
achieve. Doing so will help these policymakers understand how to
combine EM with other sanctions to maximize its potential.164
At this point, regrettably little is known about the effectiveness of
EM as an alternative to incarceration, and it is still unclear whether EM
has successfully met its purported purposes and goals.165 The
uncertainty results from sparse research into the operation and impact
of EM166 and a lack of empirical proof.167 More rigorous empirical
research is necessary to render reliable and widely applicable
conclusions,168 but until this occurs, the current research proves helpful
in assessing the uses and general successes of EM. For example, EM has
been cited as having at least three distinct uses.169 These include use in
the pretrial context, use as a sanction in and of itself immediately after
conviction, and use in conjunction with other sanctions (i.e., offenders
who receive a jail or prison sentence and are subsequently placed on EM
when released back into the community).170 Within the context of each
use, EM has already had several successes.171

163. See Gainey, Payne & O’Toole, supra note 160, at 746 (describing the main
purposes of incarceration).
164. See id. at 747 (suggesting that because the purposes of incarceration and
EM are so different, it makes theoretical and practical sense to combine
sentences for certain offenders).
165. Kathy G. Padgett, William D. Bales, & Thomas G. Blomberg, Under
Surveillance: An Empirical Test of the Effectiveness and Consequences of Electronic
Monitoring, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y, 61, 65 (2006). “Although some form of
home confinement with EM had been implemented in all 50 states by 1990 there
is still little known about its effectiveness as an alternative to incarceration or in
protecting public safety by reducing rates of reoffending.” Id.; see also Annesley
K. Schmidt, Electronic Monitoring: What Does the Literature Tell Us?, 62 FED.
PROBATION 10, 10 (1998) (explaining why little is definitively known about EM
devices’ effectiveness).
166. See, e.g., Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 522.
167. Padgett, Bales, & Blomberg, supra note 165, at 65.
168. See id. (observing that researchers themselves have recognized that EM
research “has not kept pace with the rapid implementation of the penal
strategy”).
169. Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 415; see also CROWE ET AL., supra note
136, at 14.
170. Id.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 172–76.
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Pretrial home detention under EM has allowed suspects “to avoid
the criminogenic environment found in many jails,”172 provided more
access to attorneys,173 given another option to “those unable to post
bond or to meet eligibility criteria for release on recognizance,” helped
offenders maintain employment and family ties, and depending on the
particular program, may even provide rehabilitative effects.174
Immediately after conviction, EM serves punitive and rehabilitative
purposes, protects public safety by subjecting offenders to a controlled
environment, and in some cases, deters offenders from committing new
offenses.175 Finally, an EM sanction that follows time served in an
incarcerative facility “affords offenders respect by trusting them with
early release into the community.”176
2.

How Is the Success of Electronic Monitoring Measured? Common
Methods of Evaluation
The success of EM in the pretrial context, immediately after
conviction, and following incarceration can be measured by several
factors.177 After all, EM would hardly be effective (or desirable) if it only
relieved prison and jail overcrowding.178 Accordingly, its success is often
determined by answering a number of instructive questions: How many
violations of EM conditions occurred? Did offenders fail to finish the full
length of their EM sanctions? Was EM able to deter future misconduct?
Is there public support of EM for less serious and less dangerous
offenders? Did offenders still experience the pains of incarceration while
serving time under EM supervision? Did they perceive the EM
experience to be a punitive one?179
Running through these questions are three purposes of criminal
justice: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation or reintegration.180 The

172. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 415.
173. See id. at 415–16.
174. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 523–24.
175. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 416.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 416–17 (listing EM’s successes pretrial, immediately after
conviction, and postincarceration).
178. See Stephen J. Fay, Electronically Monitored Justice: A Consideration of
Recent Evidence as to Its Effectiveness, 24 ANGLO-AM L. REV. 397, 424 (1995) (“Of
course, to do something in response to prison and jail overcrowding is not
necessarily to do something effective.”).
179. Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 416–17.
180. See DAVID LEVINSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 333–34
(2002). According to Levinson, the two main justifications for punishment are
retribution and prevention (deterrence) with rehabilitation and reintegration as
secondary justifications often grouped under deterrence. Id. Having established
the added and significant rehabilitative purpose of alternative sanctions such as
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remainder of this section will attempt to probe the effectiveness of EM
through these three lenses.
a.
The Retributive Model181
EM is often considered less restrictive than other sanctions,
especially incarceration.182 But while less restrictive, EM is still
punitive.183 At least one study points to the lack of freedom experienced
under EM.184 Others refer to the structure and control imposed by EM.185
Taken together, the studies suggest commentators’ views on EM’s
effectiveness that are in direct opposition to the one suggested by the
Alaska Court of Appeals in Matthew v. State.186 There the court decided
that EM did not approximate the restrictions experienced in prison or
jail because Matthew “could do whatever he wanted to do (except for
consume alcohol) and was free to associate with whomever he
wanted.”187 He also “did not suffer the same lack of privacy experienced
by an offender in an incarcerative facility or residential program.”188
Although these observations were correct, the court appears to have
taken a rather cursory view of EM’s retributive purpose. A
comprehensive study of offenders’ perspectives on the Alaska EM
program could shed light on this matter, providing the court with a
more reliable and more informative basis for evaluating the freedom (or
lack thereof) experienced under the Department of Correction’s EM
program.
Another broader concern about retribution entails the use of
punishment in the pretrial context.189 The question often asked is
whether it is ethical or logical to punish a “presumed innocent”

EM, this Note elevates rehabilitation and reintegration to primary rather than
secondary justifications for punishment. While all three justifications are
evaluated in this Note, particular attention will be paid to the potential
rehabilitative effect of EM.
181. According to Levinson, “[r]etribution is based on a theory that it is right
to punish those who have committed a wrong.” Id. at 333. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines it as “punishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the
offense committed; requital” and “something justly deserved; repayment;
reward.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1431 (9th ed. 2009).
182. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 432.
183. See id. at 426–27, 432.
184. See id. at 427.
185. Id. at 432.
186. 152 P.3d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
187. Id. at 472–73.
188. Id. at 473.
189. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 523–24 (suggesting the use of
EM can be both beneficial to offenders but also restrictive of offenders’ freedom).
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defendant before he or she is convicted.190 Viewed in this regard, EM is
all the more appropriate alternative to incarceration precisely because it
is less restrictive than others.191
b. The Deterrence Model
Black’s Law Dictionary defines deterrence “as a goal of criminal
law, the prevention of criminal behavior by fear of punishment.”192 As
such, recidivism193 rates provide a “logical tool for measuring the
performance of the criminal justice system in Alaska.”194 Alaska’s
criminal justice system applies presumptive sentencing and significantly
increases an offender’s sentence if she commits a new offense after an
earlier conviction.195 “Thus, arrests and convictions of recent offenders
are logical measures for the effectiveness of the system.”196 Already,
recidivism reports have helped measure the success of various criminal
justice programs and policies, including the effectiveness of the state’s
therapeutic courts.197 The same is possible with respect to evaluating the
effectiveness of Alaska’s EM program.198
In 2007, the Alaska Judicial Council conducted the state’s first
general study on recidivism.199 Unfortunately, the results were
undeniably disappointing. Just three years after they were released from
their sentences, “66% of all offenders in the sample had been re190. See id. at 524 (proposing that “the propriety of trying to rehabilitate an
unconvicted and presumed innocent pretrial population can be questioned”).
191. See id. at 523 (“Defendants wearing wristlets and confined to home or
work face more restrictions than do those on bond, but awaiting trial at home is
less restrictive than confinement in jail.”).
192. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 514 (9th ed. 2009). Deterrence is classified as
either specific (“actions taken to prevent that defendant from committing future
offenses”) or general (“actions designed to prevent others from committing
crimes”) and falls under the broader category of prevention. LEVINSON, supra
note 180, at 333.
193. Black’s Law Dictionary defines recidivism as “[a] tendency to relapse into
a habit of criminal activity or behavior.” Id. at 1384.
194. Teresa W. Carns, Recidivism in Alaska, 25 ALASKA L. REV. ONLINE ARTICLES
F.
1,
3
(2008),
http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?25online+
Alaska+L.+Rev.+1+pdf.
195. See id. at 3.
196. Id. at 3–4.
197. Id. at 4.
198. See id. at 23. The Alaska Judicial Council’s first general study of
recidivism in Alaska resulted in a comprehensive report entitled “Criminal
Recidivism in Alaska,” published in January 2007. Id. at 1. The report has
already aided the discussion of new Driving Under the Influence (DUI)
legislation and will likely prove equally helpful in the discussion of new or
restructured EM programming. Id. at 23.
199. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM IN ALASKA Exec.
Summary
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/107CriminalRecidivism.pdf.
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incarcerated at least once, for a new offense or a probation or parole
violation [and] 59% were arrested at least once for a new offense.”200
Offenders were also “most likely to recidivate during the first year of
release and even more so during the first six months.”201 Other
recidivism studies have produced mixed results with respect to EM.202
Some show that EM has successfully helped reduce recidivism rates.203
Some show there is no difference in recidivism rates after EM and after
incarceration.204 Nonetheless, even if EM does not reduce recidivism,
unchanged conviction rates with EM still allow for a more cost-effective
sanction overall.205 EM expert Dick Whitfield specifically suggests using
EM as a part of a wider approach of deterrence.206 In his opinion, seeing
how EM fits into a broader scheme of deterrence “is a much more
realistic way of measuring the impact [it] has had, and the policy
contribution it can make.”207 Of course, in assessing EM’s value as “part
of a whole,” researchers and policymakers will have to keep in mind
that EM is a strictly voluntary sanction, and therefore, the primary target
for home confinement under EM will continue to be the “low-risk”
offender who is not considered a threat to public safety.208 Unless there
is such a combined, or “hybrid,” approach to EM and “unless there is a
shift in emphasis away from surveillance and control towards (more
expensive) treatment as the basis of intermediate sanctions, electronic

200. Id.
201. Id. at 14.
202. See Gainey, Payne & O’Toole, supra note 160, at 737. (“Research findings
. . . suggest that the effects of participation in house arrest with electronic
monitoring are not clear-cut.”).
203. See id. at 737–38 (listing studies that suggest high rates of program
completion for EM programs in which offenders were sentenced to house arrest
with EM but not incarcerated).
204. See id. at 738. The authors specifically discuss a 1997 study comparing
recidivism rates of offenders sentenced to jail with those of offenders sentenced
to house arrest with EM. Id. The study found that the recidivism rates for both
groups were relatively low and the differences between the groups were more or
less negligible. Id.
205. See WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET, supra note 32, at 92. Whitfield
explains that EM’s cost-effectiveness has been used as a justification for
expanding its use. Id. He then cautions that EM must nevertheless demonstrate
an “added value” component if it is to become a more prominent part of
sentencing schemes. Id.
206. See id. at 94.
207. Id.
208. Baumer & Mendelsohn, supra note 61, at 65. EM is a strictly voluntary
sanction because the incapacitation it provides is only supported by “the threat
of detection and sanctions for violations.” Id. This suggests that low-risk
offenders, who are a lesser threat to public safety, will remain the target
population for participation in EM programming. Id.
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monitoring is never likely to ‘deliver the goods’ in terms of reduced
rates of recidivism.”209
c.
The Rehabilitation or Reintegration Model
Rehabilitation is the last of the three traditional theories of criminal
justice.210 Reintegration is closely associated with rehabilitation and
seeks “to change deviant behavior, while emphasizing that the change
can most effectively be accomplished in concert with the community,
and not in a prison or jail.”211 The Alaska Constitution espouses these
same views and even includes “the principle of reformation” as a policy
underlying the state’s criminal justice system.212 And while “an
offender’s constitutional right to rehabilitation does not extend beyond
release from custody, Alaska law recognizes a public interest in
rehabilitation.”213 One such interest involves public safety.214 Because
studies have shown “a statistical relationship between a lack of
employment and increased risk of recidivism,” released offenders
should be given adequate opportunities for employment in order to
prevent the potentially costly and dangerous consequences that would
otherwise become the burden of the Alaska taxpayer.215 In fact, the
Alaska Department of Corrections has explicitly referred to goals of
“reformation” or “reintegration” in both its mission and vision
statements.216
This evident institutional support and promotion of the
rehabilitative or reintegrating aspects of criminal justice implies that
Alaska policymakers will likely endorse a reasonable and effective
rehabilitative alternative to incarceration. Although some criticize EM as
a lesser form of rehabilitation (because offenders released on home
confinement do not get exposed to the social networks and rebuilding

209. Fay, supra note 178, at 422.
210. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398 (9th ed. 2009). Black’s Law Dictionary
also defines rehabilitation as “[t]he process of seeking to improve a criminal’s
character and outlook so that he or she can function in society without
committing other crimes.” Id.
211. LEVINSON, supra note 180, at 334.
212. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 12; see also Deborah Periman, The Hidden Impact of
a Criminal Conviction: A Brief Overview of Collateral Consequences in Alaska, ALASKA
JUST. F., Fall 2007, at 1, 1, available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/
forum/24/3fall2007/243.fall2007.pdf.
213. Periman, supra note 212, at 6.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORR., (last visited Jan. 30, 2011), http://
www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/index.jsf;jsessionid=C565744BDA54E72C6
EE44270D1718602.
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skills that incarcerated offenders are exposed to),217 EM gives eligible
offenders the ability to maintain family ties,218 teaches them to control
themselves and structure their daily activities,219 and ultimately eases
them back into society by providing them with the tools necessary to
reintegrate and comport with the expectations of their local
communities.220 The dire statistics on recidivism in Alaska provide yet
another compelling (and cost-effective) reason to reallocate current
resources to “re-entry” programs that can reduce recidivism by helping
offenders adjust to the expectations of mainstream society and their local
communities.221 EM is a fitting program in this regard.
In order to consistently reach its full rehabilitative potential, EM
should be combined with other correctional programs that focus on
treatment.222 This will require a much more substantial financial
investment in combined EM efforts and a major shift away from
surveillance and control to a more integrative, and hence, more
rehabilitative and reintegrating option.223

IV. ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS A VIABLE BUT INCOMPLETE
ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION
As an alternative to incarceration, home confinement under EM has
proven significantly more cost-effective.224 Nonetheless, its ability to

217. See Fay, supra note 178, at 409 (arguing that EM, “in its obsession with
potential cost-savings . . . ignores the value of assessment, counseling and
support offered by experienced probation personnel”); see id. at 416 (suggesting
that “rehabilitation is seldom a specific objective of electronic monitoring
[programs]”).
218. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 428 (summarizing statements from
offenders sentenced to EM that note EM gives offenders the ability to maintain
ties with their families).
219. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 524 (stating that EM forces
participating offenders to plan their activities and may thus impose order on
heretofore disorderly lives).
220. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 416 (proposing that the use of EM
as a sanction has rehabilitative effects and helps offenders reintegrate into the
community).
221. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM IN ALASKA, supra note
199, at 14; see also Carns, supra note 194, at 27.
222. See Fay, supra note 178, at 417 (discussing how researchers have already
recognized that EM programs should include a treatment component and
focusing on the insistence that EM be accompanied by treatment plans that cater
to each individual offender and are designed to have effects that last beyond the
offender’s release date).
223. See id. at 423.
224. See THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 3 fig.6 (demonstrating that the use
of EM saves the state about twenty-two times what it would have spent on other
alternatives to incarceration).
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carry out the three theories, or goals, of criminal justice has not provided
the same assurance. Perhaps this is the reason why the Alaska Court of
Appeals restricted the use of correctional EM in Matthew v. State225 and
why others courts have ruled similarly.226 In order to persuade these
courts—and particularly the Alaska Court of Appeals—that EM is
capable of carrying out the three goals of criminal justice in an efficient
and effective manner, it is imperative to highlight the potential EM
would reach as part of a “hybrid” correctional scheme.227
In Matthew, the court expressed dissatisfaction with what it
perceived to be the lack of “institutional rules and routines” in
correctional systems based on home confinement with EM.228 Other
critics argue that home confinement under EM cannot punish enough,229
cannot deter criminals from recidivating anymore than other
alternatives,230 and cannot rehabilitate because it strips offenders of the
social networking and rebuilding skills offered in prison.231 Any
proposal for a hybrid scheme obviously will have to correct for these
perceived shortcomings if it is to be implemented and widely accepted
for use at various stages of the correctional process, and particularly the
sentencing stage.
Matthew (and its stringent adherence to Nygren) will pose some
obstacles to hybrid endeavors because it emphasizes the perceived
shortcomings of EM. But the opinion is not definitive precedent for how
to approach EM as a judicial sanction. A court will still give credit for a
sentence served as long as that sentence was the one an offender

225. See 152 P.3d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
226. See also CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 24–25 (citing Fraley v. U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Herrera, 913 F.2d
761 (11th Cir. 1991); Pennsylvania v. Shartle, 652 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995))
(discussing selective cases in which courts denied credit for time served on EM).
227. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 431 (“[C]ommunity-based sanctions
can be effectively used in conjunction with other traditional sanctions.”). Here
the authors specifically suggest that applying EM directly after incarceration
would be most effective. Id.
228. See 152 P.3d at 472.
229. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 432 (explaining that EM “is often
misinterpreted as a slap on the wrist”).
230. See Fay, supra note 178, at 415 (noting that various research studies have
found that EM offers no significant advantages in terms of reducing recidivism
rates); cf. Gainey, Payne & O’Toole, supra note 160, at 737 (“Research findings . . .
suggest that the effects of participation in house arrest with electronic
monitoring are not clear-cut.”).
231. See Fay, supra note 178, at 409 (arguing that the strategy of substituting
inexpensive EM for incarceration, “in its obsession with potential costsavings . . . ignores the value of assessment, counseling and support offered by
experienced probation personnel”); see id. at 416 (“[R]ehabilitation is seldom a
specific objective of electronic monitoring [programs].”).
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received. Thus, the success of EM as a sanction will likely depend on
other factors: whether courts will be willing to impose EM as a sentence
in and of itself, whether the appropriate vehicles exist to carry out such a
sanction, and whether the public will recognize it as just if it is used
more widely.232
Strategically pairing EM with another correctional system can win
over critics and EM-opposed courts by combining the clear benefits of
EM with a scheme that embodies the “institutional” elements that EM
may lack. It is therefore crucial to choose an appropriate alternative to
incarceration to complete the “hybrid.” The options are abundant, but
this Note will attempt to narrow the available choices to those most
advantageous to Alaska.

A.

Proposal One: Combine Electronic Monitoring with Existing
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Programs

Several commentators have already recommended adding a more
substantial treatment element to home confinement under EM.233
Combining EM sanctions with existing therapeutic alternatives to
incarceration would supply this “treatment” aspect. Even more
convincing is the fact that Alaska has already successfully implemented
therapeutic, or problem-solving, courts in several cities. The courts work
to address a myriad of therapeutic concerns and are akin to traditional
courts because they weigh the seriousness of a crime and then look for
an appropriate sanction.234 They are innovative in their additional focus
on treatment options and the likelihood that offenders will participate in
available options and rehabilitate from that participation in ways that
benefit both offenders and society.235 By striving “to balance the letter of

232. The author gives special thanks to Professor Lisa Kern Griffin, Duke
University School of Law, for assistance with this paragraph.
233. See Fay, supra note 178, at 417 (pointing to two research studies which
have already recognized that many of the offenders subjected to home
confinement under EM should receive other treatment in conjunction with EM).
234. See Therapeutic Jurisprudence, ALASKA JUST. F., Spring 2009, at 10, 10,
available
at
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/26/1spring2009/
261.spring2009.pdf.
235. See id. Other common purposes of such courts include (1) providing
positive outcomes for not only offenders but also victims and society as a whole;
(2) promoting reform by responding to problems such as substance abuse or
mental illness; (3) encouraging judicial involvement to address offenders’
problems; (4) encouraging collaboration with groups operating outside the
justice system in order to improve treatment options; (5) taking on
“unconventional” and less adversarial roles; (6) screening and assessing which
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the law and the spirit in addressing issues of fairness to offenders and to
victims and communities,” these problem-solving courts have
demonstrated an ability to reduce both recidivism and incarceration
rates.236
Problem-solving courts’ success with respect to deterrence and
rehabilitation237 provides compelling reason for combining therapeutic
jurisprudence with EM. But since most of Alaska’s problem-solving
courts concentrate on addictions or mental health issues,238 it will be
necessary to expand the scope of the courts’ current reach (in terms of
what issues they address). Then, especially with lower risk offenders,
the courts could possibly prescribe sentences that involve elements of
institution or community-driven therapy followed by home confinement
on EM.
A sanction involving elements of therapeutic jurisprudence
followed by the use of EM would provide a more graduated and guided
release to home confinement on EM and could therefore broaden the
scope of eligible offenders. For example, higher risk offenders that may
have been excluded from EM participation due to inappropriate
behavior in jail or prison or severe substance abuse or mental illness239
might find a “second chance” in this proposal.
Then again, the extent that an offender would be eligible should
still be weighed against the probability that the hybrid might
successfully punish, deter, and rehabilitate him. This would vary
according to the unique capabilities and capacities of each individual
hybrid program. Reasonable expectations for community safety would
also factor in, so offenders deemed highly dangerous probably would
not meet the criteria for eligibility unless the conditions imposed by the
hybrid advanced to accommodate such offenders. And since assessing
these matters would require additional time and monetary investment
on top of what would likely be an already expensive hybrid, selectively
screening potential participants might be even more necessary with the
hybrid than without.
At the very least, the therapeutic justice-EM approach would help
relieve the state’s overcrowded prisons and bolster EM’s ability to deter
and rehabilitate offenders. But in case policymakers or other critics
offenders should be referred to therapeutic courts; and (7) using screening and
assessing tools as early as possible to identify potential candidates. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 36 (recommending exclusion criteria
for EM participation, with one criterion being “severe substance abuse or mental
illness that limits offender’s ability to control his or her behavior”).

ALLADINA_FINAL_2

158

5/6/2011 2:27:14 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[28:1

argue that this hybrid lacks an appropriate degree of “retribution,”
another option would be to impose a shorter sentence of traditional
incarceration followed by the therapeutic justice-EM approach.
Although this alternative might not immediately relieve jail and prison
overcrowding, it could speed up the turnover in these facilities while
successfully deterring and rehabilitating participants. Ultimately, no
matter how the hybrid is implemented, it will surely require significant
research, planning, resource redistribution, financial investment, and
patience.
B.

Proposal Two: Combine Electronic Monitoring with Halfway
Housing

A halfway house, or residential community treatment center, “is a
transitional housing facility designed to rehabilitate people who have
recently left a prison or medical-care facility, or who otherwise need
help in adjusting to a normal life.”240 The restrictive community-based
environment comprises the punitive component of this sanction while
the reintegration and transitional services offered to participants
comprise the rehabilitative, or reintegration, component.241 Adding an
EM element to halfway housing could reinforce the sanction’s restrictive
and retributive aspects. This option would also appease those concerned
with public safety. And for several of the same reasons the therapeutic
jurisprudence-EM option allows a larger class of offenders to reap the
benefits of EM, the community-driven reintegration offered in the
halfway house-EM option likewise would allow many more offenders to
benefit.
Although halfway houses have not been shown to reduce
recidivism any more than other alternatives to incarceration,242
policymakers could potentially borrow from the successful
recommendations of therapeutic courts and apply those to the halfway
house-EM combination. In the alternative, policymakers could
implement further restrictions on halfway houses that would more
closely reflect the “institutional rules and routines” found in traditional
jails or prisons. By then adding the EM element of restraint, correctional
systems would better achieve a balance between community-driven and
institutional-enforced retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

240. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (9th ed. 2009).
241. See Klein-Saffran, supra note 162, at 24–25.
242. See generally Charles L. Walsh and Scott H. Beck, Predictors of Recidivism
Among Halfway House Residents, 15 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1066 (1990).
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CONCLUSION
In order to move toward the realization of EM “hybrid” efforts,
whether based on therapeutic jurisprudence or halfway housing, Alaska
policymakers need to encourage public understanding and generate
wider support for EM at different stages of the criminal justice process.
Policymakers should also recognize the feasibility of combining diverse
sanctions, consider how different offenders respond to different
sanctions, and remember not to overrate or underrate EM’s potential as
an efficient and effective alternative to incarceration when part of a
combined correctional scheme.243 These steps will allow policymakers to
maximize the potential benefits of EM while addressing the concerns
discussed by the Alaska Court of Appeals in Matthew v. State and cited
by various critics. Because these concerns pinpoint a perceived lack of
institutional structure, policymakers should first conduct an in-depth
statistical analysis of the advantages and deficiencies of home
confinement under EM in Alaska.244 Knowing these advantages and
deficiencies will allow them to target the alternatives to incarceration
that will produce the most efficient and effective “hybrid” when
combined with EM.
The success EM already has had as the state’s most cost-effective
alternative to incarceration and as a viable method of reintegration
suggests that it certainly can improve Alaska’s correctional system if
executed strategically. While the means to this end may be costly in the
short term, the results would allow for a more cost-effective and
comprehensive administration of criminal justice in the long term.
Consequently, Alaska policymakers will have to redistribute resources
and seek out new ones in addition to planning and executing the
substantive EM hybrid. Then, through trial and error, the state’s
correctional department will be in a much more informed and
experienced position to determine whether to expand the use of EM or
continue the search for a more suitable alternative to incarceration.
Perhaps this determination will confirm the perceived shortcomings of
EM discussed in Matthew v. State or perhaps it will have the opposite
effect—proving that the potential of home confinement under EM can be
realized in Alaska. This, in turn, could affect the status of the statutes
governing EM use in the state and could even affect the current
interpretation and importance of Nygren v. State. For now, the state
ought to at least engage in a close examination of what could potentially
243. See Gainey, Payne & O’Toole, supra note 160, at 749–50.
244. See DeMichele & Payne, supra note 23, at 34 (“[T]echnologies used to
monitor offenders in the community have both benefits and drawbacks.”).
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be an invaluable alternative to incarceration at all stages of the criminal
process.

